We report the results of duopoly market experiments where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices. The theoretical literature pertaining to these duopoly models suggests that the way residual demand is rationed is fundamental to the character of equilibrium outcomes when capacity costs are sufficiently low. The experiments test this prediction by varying capacity cost and demand rationing schemes.
Introduction
This paper reports the results of duopoly market experiments where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices. The theoretical literature pertaining to these duopoly models suggests that the way residual demand is rationed is fundamental to the character of equilibrium outcomes. The goal of this study is to test the impact of residual demand rationing on the behavior of subjects in an experimental environment.
In a two-stage game, where firms first commit to capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) (hereafter K&S) prove that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome coincides with the Cournot equilibrium outcome with efficient rationing of residual demand.
Efficient rationing means that the higher priced firm is left with the worst possible residual demand curve. If demand is composed of many similar consumers that each demand multiple units and we construct aggregate demand by way of a representative consumer, then efficient rationing is imposed by the model. On the other hand, if demand is instead composed of a mass of consumers with unit demand and varied willingness-to-pay, then the efficient rationing rule imposes the restriction that the highest valued consumers buy from the firm with the lower price. Davidson and Deneckere (1986) make a compelling argument that proportional rationing is a more appropriate assumption in the latter case. Proportional rationing means that a uniform distribution of possible consumers buy from the firm with the lower price. Davidson and Deneckere show that under proportional rationing (as well as any rationing rule other than the efficient rule), the Cournot outcome is not necessarily the unique equilibrium of the two stage game. The Davidson and Deneckere result is problematic for the K&S model because it deflates the generality of their theoretical result.
1 Lepore (2009) further clarifies the relationship between proportional rationing and the Cournot outcome. In the K&S game with proportional rationing, the Cournot outcome is the unique Nash equilibrium only when capacity cost is greater than a threshold level.
The purpose of our experiments is to assess if the play of experimental subjects in the twostage game is sensitive to the rationing scheme in the way that theory predicts. To do this, we construct an experimental design with four treatments. The treatments vary by two controls: the demand rationing scheme and the cost of capacity. We conduct two efficient rationing treatments, one with a high capacity cost and one with a low cost. For both costs, theory predicts that the outcome coincide with the Cournot model. We also conduct two treatments using proportional rationing, one with each of the capacity costs used in the efficient rationing treatments. With a high cost, theory predicts the outcome should coincide with the Cournot model, as in the case of efficient rationing. However, theory predicts that the Cournot outcome should not occur when the cost of capacity is low, and prices should not clear the market.
Recently, several authors have used laboratory experiments as a means to empirically test the predictions of the K&S model. All papers find that inexperienced subjects choose higher capacities in the K&S game than the Cournot prediction. Goodwin and Mestelman (2010) compare a K&S duopoly game where subjects choose capacities followed by prices with the corresponding Cournot game where subjects only choose capacities and then prices are set to clear the market. They find that inexperienced subjects initially choose much higher capacities in the K&S game than in the Cournot game; however, these differences disappear by the end of the experiment at which point capacities are close to the Cournot prediction in both games. Davis (1999) compares a K&S triopoly game with a similar game without advance production. Without advance production, subjects posted prices and only incurred costs for units that were actually sold. He finds that subjects played significantly differently with advance production than without; the treatments with advance production exhibited more volatility in outcomes and lower capacities. Capacities were consistently higher than the Cournot prediction with and without advance production. Muren (1999) compares the behavior of experienced and inexperienced subjects in a K&S triopoly game.
She finds that experienced players' capacity choices are close to the Cournot prediction, while inexperienced players' capacities are above the Cournot prediction.
2 Anderhub et al. (2003) report on differentiated duopoly experiments with capacity precommitment.
3
Subjects choose capacities only once every ten rounds in order to improve the likelihood that subjects will play market clearing prices. They find that pricing behavior is in accordance with the differentiated product Cournot model and that capacity choices are stable but larger than the Cournot prediction. All four of these papers use efficient demand rationing in the markets with advance production.
In a closely related paper, Kruse (1993) looks at the effect of the demand rationing scheme in Bertrand-Edgeworth games with exogenous capacity constraints and finds significant differences in market outcomes with different rationing schemes. 4 The demand rationing scheme impacts the experimental outcomes in accordance with theoretical predictions; subjects set higher prices with random rationing than with efficient rationing. Random rationing is identical to our proportional rationing in expected value. 5 Our study is the first study to in-vestigate how the demand rationing scheme affects experimental outcomes in a K&S game, a question motivated by the sensitivity of theoretical predictions to the specific rationing scheme.
We find that capacity cost has a clear effect on the frequency with which the Cournot outcome is observed. As predicted, when costs are high, subjects regularly play the Cournot outcome regardless of rationing scheme. In contrast, the Cournot outcome is relatively rare when costs are low, even with efficient rationing. Subjects consistently choose capacities above the Cournot level when costs are low, leading to lower profits than if they had played Cournot.
We also find that subjects usually choose market clearing prices when such prices are an equilibrium in the second stage pricing subgame (including when the Cournot outcome occurs in the first stage capacity game). This result is important as an argument in favor of the original Cournot model. Cournot assumed that prices will be set to clear the market after quantities are chosen. K&S subsequently showed that such pricing is the equilibrium outcome of the two stage game when Cournot quantities are chosen in the first stage and there is efficient demand rationing. We show that observed behavior in the pricing subgame is consistent with K&S's prediction. Our results also corroborate the findings in Kruse (1993) that rationing scheme impacts pricing behavior, with higher prices observed with proportional rationing than with efficient rationing in the low cost sessions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant theoretical results. Section 3 describes the experimental design. We present our experimental results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations
Our experimental duopoly markets utilize a simple form of linear demand. To demonstrate the theoretical results, it is also necessary to solve for the optimal quantity of a zero cost monopolist q m , which is:
Before presenting the theoretical results, we explain the two rationing rules used in our experiments.
Rationing Schemes
Scheme 1: Efficient Rationing 6 We chose to study duopoly markets, similar to Goodwin and Mestelman (2010) , because the theoretical predictions developed by K&S as well as Lepore (2009) apply to duopolies. We also wanted to keep the game as simple as possible. One potential downside of duopolies is that subjects learn the profits of their opponent whereas in a triopoly, subjects may only learn aggregate capacities and not the specific capacities and profits of each competitor. Huck et al. (2000) argue that subjects may imitate the strategy of the best subject from the previous round, leading to more competitive outcomes with higher capacities than the Cournot outcome. In our particular experiment, this could potentially explain the high capacities we observe in our low cost treatments but it fails to explain the convergence to Cournot outcomes in the high cost treatments. In the simplest sense, efficient rationing of residual demand involves the low priced firm selling its full capacity to the highest valued customers. Thus, the high priced firm is left with a residual demand composed of the lowest valued consumers.
We use an example to further explain this rationing scheme. Suppose that player 1 has selected q 1 = a/3 and p 1 = a/3. What is the efficient residual demand firm 2 can get if it prices higher than a/3? The residual demand is: 
Scheme 2: Proportional Rationing
Under proportional rationing, instead of the highest valued consumers buying from the low priced firm, a proportional amount of high valued and low valued consumers buy from the low priced firm. This leaves a much more favorable residual demand for the high priced firm.
We continue with the same example as before to illustrate the differences in the residual demand with the two rationing schemes. Again, suppose that player 1 has selected q 1 = a/3
and p 1 = a/3. What is the proportional residual demand firm 2 can get if it prices higher than a/3? The residual demand is: Assuming p 1 and p 2 are both between zero and a, 
Theoretical Predictions
Under efficient rationing, K&S establish that the unique Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game always matches the Cournot outcome. Hence, the Cournot outcome is predicted by theory for any admissible capacity cost parameters. With proportional rationing, this is not the case. Instead, the Cournot outcome is an equilibrium of the two stage game if and only if the marginal cost of capacity is sufficiently high. Specifically, Lepore (2009) shows that the Cournot outcome is the equilibrium outcome of the two stage game if and only if the Cournot equilibrium quantity is less than or equal to half the zero cost monopolist quantity,
If condition (1) is not satisfied, then the Cournot outcome is not an equilibrium of the two stage game with proportional rationing. The contrast in the theoretical results for the two rationing schemes is driven by differences in the equilibria of the pricing subgames. Because of the disparity in equilibrium pricing, the same quantities can result in different equilibrium expected revenue for the two schemes and can therefore be an equilibrium with one scheme and not the other.
As long as the Cournot quantities yield pricing subgames in which the market clearing price is a pure strategy equilibrium, these quantities will be the unique equilibrium quantities of the two stage game. With efficient rationing, any symmetric quantities smaller than the zero cost Cournot quantity (q * 0 = a/3) result in equilibrium pricing that is symmetric and market clearing. As the aggregate quantity becomes too large, sellers can increase profits by raising prices above the market clearing price and letting some of their produced units go unsold. In such cases, equilibrium pricing involves mixing, with expected revenue greater than with market clearing pricing. Since the Cournot quantities are always less than q * 0 , they are always the unique equilibrium of the two stage game with efficient rationing.
Proportional rationing raises the revenues available to sellers by deviating from the market clearing price, and for this reason reduces the quantity for which the market clearing price is a pure strategy equilibrium. It turns out that with proportional rationing, any symmetric quantities smaller than half the zero cost monopoly quantity (q m /2 = a/4) result in equilibrium pricing that is symmetric and market clearing. For all symmetric quantities larger, the pricing subgame only has a mixed strategy equilibrium, with expected revenue greater than with market clearing pricing. Since the proportional residual demand is always weakly larger than the efficient residual demand, a firm will find it profitable to defect away from market clearing pricing, to a higher price, at any symmetric quantities greater than q m /2. Since q m /2 < q * 0 , symmetric quantities between q m /2 and q * 0 lead to mixed strategy pricing in the proportional game and market clearing pricing in the efficient game. For low enough marginal cost, the Cournot quantities will be in this range.
The difference in equilibrium pricing with symmetric quantities between q m /2 and q explains the difference in equilibrium quantities for the two rationing schemes. As a result of the mixed strategy equilibrium pricing, the equilibrium expected profit and the marginal expected profit are greater with proportional rationing than with efficient for symmetric quantities greater than q m /2. Since the marginal expected profit is greater with proportional rationing, any equilibrium quantities of the efficient game, if larger than q m /2, cannot be equilibrium quantities of the proportional game. 
Experimental Design
Subjects played in one of four treatments designed to test the effect of cost and rationing scheme on firm behavior. Capacity cost was set either at $6 per unit (the high cost game)
or at $1 per unit (the low cost game). For each cost, one treatment used efficient rationing and another treatment used proportional rationing. In all four treatments, firms faced a demand curve of D(p) = min{12 − p, 0} where demand is expressed in hundreds of units.
In order to simplify the decisions that subjects faced, the action space was made discrete so that agents chose an integer capacity between 1 and 12 (in hundreds of units) and an integer price between 0 and 12.
Given this setup, we can make predictions regarding capacity choices for each treatment.
Condition (1) reduces to
Thus, the Cournot outcome is an equilibrium in the game with proportional rationing if and only if Condition (2) holds. In the high cost game, we predict Cournot capacities (q * h = 2) and market clearing pricing regardless of rationing scheme. In the low cost game, we predict
Cournot capacities (q * l = 4) and market clearing pricing only with efficient rationing.
Our main goal was to find the specification that best corresponded to the theory while minimizing the complexity of subjects' decisions. We chose this particular specification because the discretization is coarse enough that choices and payoffs can be displayed in a
parsimonious Holt (1985) explains that discretization has the potential drawback of creating unintended equilibria, in our particular specification the discretization does not change our theoretical predictions. The important theoretical predictions of the continuous strategy space game, which are maintained in the discrete experimental version, are: the game has the Cournot outcome as the equilibrium outcome with the efficient rationing rule, whether costs are high or low, and with the proportional rationing rule when capacity cost is low, and the game does not have the Cournot outcome as an equilibrium outcome with the proportional rationing rule and low capacity cost.
We can make additional predictions about firm behavior in the pricing subgame after capacities have been revealed. These predictions depend on the rationing scheme, but they do not depend on cost since all production costs are sunk at this point. The pricing subgame was displayed to subjects in a 13 by 13 table with columns repre- It would take a considerable amount of time to carefully study each of the 144 possible pricing subgame tables. To help facilitate subjects' understanding of the game, they were given about 2 minutes to study the tables at the beginning of the experiment. Subsequently, they played two practice rounds against a computer opponent who made random choices.
These practice rounds gave the subjects additional time to study the various tables while also learning how the sequence of choices work in each round.
We remained concerned that the initial time plus the practice rounds would not be enough for subjects to fully understand all of their options as a result of the large action space. As a result, the first 10 rounds of the 40 round experiment were designated practice rounds. In these 10 rounds, subjects played against other subjects in the room, but the results did not affect their payment for participation. These additional 10 rounds gave the subjects more time to study the various tables as well to observe the choices made by actual opponents.
In some cases, losses were common in early rounds so these practice rounds also provided a way to eliminate losses from subjects' earnings.
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Starting in the eleventh round, the results of each round were added to the total payoff received by the subjects at the end of the experiment. A conversion ratio of 500 lab dollars to $1.00 U.S. was used in the high cost treatments and 1500 lab dollars to $1.00 U.S. was used in the low cost treatments. These conversion rates lead to identical cash payments if subjects play the Cournot outcome.
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Subjects played forty rounds altogether, including the 10 practice rounds. Each round, subjects were randomly assigned to another player in the room in order to approximate a one-shot game. Subjects were not allowed to communicate in any way during the course of the experiment.
The full instructions seen by the participants are included in an appendix. These were read aloud to subjects at the beginning of the experiment and were also displayed on each subject's computer screen.
Altogether, 116 subjects participated in the experiment. 
Experimental Results
We first analyze capacity choices, then consider results in the pricing subgame.
Capacities
The fundamental prediction to test in this paper is how the interaction of cost and rationing scheme affects capacity choices. The Cournot capacity is the predicted outcome in three of the four treatments, with the low cost proportional rationing treatment the only game where Cournot capacities are not predicted. Table 1 shows the frequency of Cournot capacities for each treatment in the paid rounds (rounds 11 to 40). Figure 5 shows histograms of the capacity choices in the final 30 rounds (the rounds played for money) in each of the four treatments. Figure 6 shows the same histograms using only data from the final 10 rounds. It is clear from the histograms that most subjects play
Cournot capacities (q * h = 2) in the high cost treatments. In contrast, the Cournot capacity (q * l = 4) occurs less often in the low cost treatments and there is more dispersion in the capacity choices.
To examine how capacity choices changed over the course of each experimental session, Figure 7 shows the average capacity in each round for each treatment over all 40 rounds of the session (including the 10 practice rounds at the beginning of the session). The vertical lines in the graphs show one standard deviation around the mean capacity in each round. proportional high cost, and proportional low cost, respectively. t represents the round, ranging from 1 to 40, and ϵ t is a random normal error term. This regression estimates the starting point (β c ) and ending point (γ i ) of a convergence process where each cohort has its own starting point but all cohorts in a given treatment share a common end point.
The estimates of the four γ i coefficients are presented in Table 2 . Note that γ EH and γ P H , the end points of the high cost treatments, are both slightly above the Cournot capacity of 2.
In both cases, the estimates are significantly greater than 2 at a 1% significance level. The difference between γ EH and γ P H is 0.12, not statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value:
0.088).
The end points of the low cost treatments, γ EL and γ P L , are greater than the Cournot capacity of 4 by a much wider margin than in the high cost treatments. Again, both estimates are significantly greater than 4 at a 1% significance level. Both low cost treatments converge to capacities between 6 and 7. The difference between γ EL and γ P L is 0.41, significant at the 1% level. Table 1 demonstrates that Cournot capacities are common in the high cost treatments, especially in the later rounds. In the 30 rounds played for money, subjects in the high cost treatments chose a capacity of 2 in 1212 out of 1740 capacity choices (70%). In the final 10 rounds, subjects chose q = 2 in 473 out of 580 chances (82%). These frequencies were roughly the same under both rationing schemes.
At the individual level, the majority of subjects in the high cost treatments appear to have settled on q = 2 with 10 rounds to go. Thirty-nine out of 58 subjects (67%) played q = 2 in every round for the final 10 rounds.
We make the following observation regarding capacity choices when costs are high.
Observation 1 In the high cost treatments, subjects converged on the Cournot capacity
(q * h = 2) regardless of the rationing scheme.
Cournot capacities are relatively rare in the low cost treatments. In the 30 rounds played for money, subjects chose a capacity of 4 in 138 out of 1740 chances (8%). This improves slightly when looking only at the final 10 rounds, with 65 out of 580 choices at a capacity of 4 (11%). In most rounds, subjects in these treatments choose capacities above the Cournot capacity, with 1537 capacity choices above 4 in the final 30 rounds (88%). While this was expected in the proportional rationing treatment, this goes against the theoretical prediction for efficient rationing.
There was also less convergence in the low cost treatments compared to the high cost treatments. In the final 10 rounds, only 12 out of 58 subjects (21%) chose the same capacity in all rounds.
We make the following observation regarding capacity choices when costs are low.
Observation 2 In the low cost treatments, subjects rarely chose the Cournot capacity (q *
l =
4) regardless of the rationing scheme.
The equilibrium outcome is more salient to subjects when costs are high. This is a fundamental distinction between the two games, not a feature of our experimental design; when production costs are low, firms lose less when they produce too much. In the low cost sessions, by definition, there is a very small loss from overproducing. On the other hand, there were large gains to be had if a player's opponent chose a low quantity and the player had produced more than the Cournot quantity. Consider the following example. If a player's opponent chooses a quantity of 3 and price of 6 (the joint payoff maximizing strategy), the player can earn substantially higher profits by undercutting and pricing at 5. At a price of 5, the player would want to have precommitted to 7 units to earn the highest profit of 700*5-100*5=3000. If the opponent also chose a high quantity, very little was lost in terms of unsold inventory since production cost is so low. If both players choose a quantity of 6 and a price of 4, then they can each sell 4 units with 2 units unsold and profits are 400*4-100*6=1000. Had they each only produced 4 units and priced the same, they would have reached the Cournot equilibrium and each earned profits of 1200. Thus, little was lost by overproducing (if subjects priced at 4), but subjects may have been attracted by potentially large gains from overproducing, even if those gains were unusual. In practice, the loss from overproducing could be much larger if subjects played lower prices in the pricing subgame;
we will revisit this in the pricing section below.
Finally, we consider the effect of the rationing scheme on capacities. In the high cost treatments, we have already noted that Cournot capacities were prevalent with either rationing scheme. In the low cost treatments, not only were Cournot capacities rare, but there was also very little difference in the observed capacities with the two rationing schemes.
Although the results from Table 2 indicate statistically significant differences in capacity choices by rationing scheme in the low cost treatments, we note that these differences are very small in magnitude relative to the differences between chosen capacities and the Cournot outcome. Based on Figures 5, 6 , and 7 and Tables 1 and 2 , we state the following observation regarding the effect of rationing scheme. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 
Observation 3 Rationing scheme has little or no effect on capacity choices in either the

Pricing
Although capacities in the efficient and proportional low cost treatments are similar, there are significant differences in pricing between these two treatments. Subjects tended to choose higher prices in the proportional treatment than the efficient treatment when costs were low. To further compare pricing in the two low cost treatments, we estimated the effect of rationing scheme and the outcome of the capacity stage on price. This regression allowed for individual random effects and included a dummy variable for every possible outcome in the capacity stage as well as a dummy variable for proportional rationing. This allows testing of the effect of rationing on pricing, conditional on the chosen capacities in the first stage.
We find that prices are higher by an average of 0.71 in the proportional rationing sessions with the coefficient highly significant (standard error = 0.05, p-value < 0.001). This result is consistent with the findings of Kruse (1993) in an experiment with exogenous capacities.
Observation 4 Subjects chose higher prices in the low cost proportional rationing treatment than in the low cost efficient treatment, conditional on the chosen capacities.
Despite the high capacities observed in both low cost treatments, subjects could do almost as well as the Cournot outcome by pricing at the Cournot level of $4 since the cost of the unsold inventory is low. Pricing well above the market clearing price can mitigate the negative effects of choosing high capacities. In fact, we observe that subjects in the proportional rationing treatment have similar earnings to those in the two high cost treatments where Cournot outcomes were very common. However, subjects in the efficient rationing treatment price significantly lower and hence earn less money in the experiment. After many rounds of high capacities and low prices, it remains unanswered why subjects in the low cost efficient rationing treatment did not reduce capacities in the later rounds; however, this result is consistent with prior K&S experiments.
By choosing higher capacities and lower prices, these subjects received substantially lower profits on average. Average profit in the low cost efficient treatments was $0.38 per round compared to $0.53 per round in the proportional low cost; had subjects chosen capacities of 4 and played market clearing prices, they would have earned $0.80 per round. In the high cost games where Cournot outcomes were more common, earnings per round were about the same as the proportional low cost at $0.53 in the efficient high cost and $0.56 in the proportional high cost. 10 We now consider whether subjects set prices to clear the market when it is an equilibrium in the pricing subgame. An underlying principle of the Cournot model is that after choosing quantities, prices are set to clear the market. In the two stage K&S game, however, setting prices to clear the market is only an equilibrium with relatively small capacities, as shown in Figure 3 . We also examine how rationing scheme affects pricing by looking specifically at capacity outcomes where the market clearing equilibrium occurs only with efficient rationing. When market clearing pricing is an equilibrium of the pricing subgame, subjects selected the market clearing price 1552 out of 1750 chances (89%) in the final 30 rounds. This result was stronger in later rounds with the percentage increasing to 94% in the final 10 rounds of the experiment. In the low cost treatments, subjects only faced pricing games with a market clearing price equilibrium 2% of the time. Thus, this result is a consequence of behavior in the high cost treatments.
When the market clearing price is not an equilibrium in the pricing subgame, subjects played a different price 1708 out of 1730 chances (99%). This percentage was about the a This row refers to all rounds in all treatments in which both subjects chose the Cournot capacity. b This row refers to all rounds in all treatments in which subjects chose capacities that yield different pricing predictions based on rationing scheme (i.e. the lightly shaded squares in Figure 3 ).
same across all treatments although this prediction was far more prevalent in the low cost treatments (98% of all price choices) than the high cost treatments (1% of all price choices).
Based on this data, we make the following observation about market clearing pricing in the second stage pricing subgame.
Observation 5 Subjects overwhelmingly chose the market clearing price when predicted and overwhelmingly deviated from the market clearing price when predicted.
When both players in a market chose the Cournot capacity, the market clearing price is predicted for all treatments except the low cost proportional rationing treatment. The bulk of this data comes from the high cost treatments where Cournot capacities were common.
In these treatments, the market clearing price was chosen 851 out of 894 chances (95%).
In the efficient low cost treatment, the market clearing price was chosen 5 out of 6 times (83%) when both players chose the Cournot capacity. There were four rounds in the low cost proportional rationing treatment in which both players chose the Cournot capacity. In 3 of the 4 rounds (75%), subjects did not choose prices to clear the market. Although we have a very small amount of data in which both players choose Cournot capacities in the low cost treatments, we do observe the predicted reversal in pricing with all but one instance with efficient rationing resulting in market clearing prices and all but one instance with proportional rationing resulting in different prices.
Observation 6 Conditional on both players choosing Cournot capacities, most subjects
chose market clearing prices when it was an equilibrium in the pricing subgame.
As seen in Figure 3 , there are several capacity combinations where the market clearing price is an equilibrium with efficient rationing but not proportional rationing. To further examine the effect of the rationing scheme, we consider how subjects set their prices, conditional on these capacity outcomes. Although the amount of data is small, the results of the pricing subgame when these capacity outcomes occurred are summarized in the row labeled "Light Shaded q's" in Table 3 . Subjects facing efficient rationing priced at the market clearing price (as predicted) 36% of the time. Subjects facing proportional rationing should not set market clearing prices and they did only 9% of the time.
Conclusion
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the effect of cost and rationing scheme on firm behavior in duopoly markets with capacity precommitment. In accordance with the theory of firm behavior in these games, we predicted that firms facing high capacity costs would choose Cournot capacities and market clearing prices regardless of rationing scheme. After an initial period of learning that is common in experiments of this sort, most subjects did in fact settle on Cournot capacities and market clearing prices. This was true of subjects facing both efficient rationing and proportional rationing.
For firms facing low capacity costs, we predicted Cournot capacities and market clearing prices only with efficient rationing. In these sessions, Cournot capacities were rare with either rationing scheme. Capacities were well above the Cournot outcome with both rationing schemes, and there was no notable difference between rationing schemes.
The lack of an effect of rationing scheme variations in the low cost treatments may be attributable to the difficult learning problem presented by a combination of a large potential quantity space and the number of subsequent pricing games. In the high cost treatments, the problem of converging on the equilibrium is considerably simpler, since subjects can eliminate quantities which lead to losses at any price. In the low cost treatments, by way of contrast, sellers had to sort through a greater number of pricing matrices. Perhaps with further experience or a different design the effect of changes in the rationing rules might be detected. Nevertheless, the present experiment usefully documents that the effect of rationing rule variations is of second order importance relative to the general problem of equilibration in K&S games.
Our results in the low cost treatments are consistent with results from prior K&S experiments. Similar to the prior experiments, we find that capacities are usually set above the Cournot prediction. We also confirm the result from Kruse (1993) that subjects set higher prices when facing proportional rationing than with efficient rationing, and we note that subjects overwhelmingly choose market clearing prices when such prices are an equilibrium in the second stage pricing game.
To summarize our new results, capacity cost has a dramatic effect on the viability of the Cournot outcome in duopoly games with capacity precommitment, with convergence to Cournot outcomes clear in the high cost treatments but not in the low cost treatments.
In contrast, varying the rationing scheme, expected to have an effect only in the low cost treatments, has no effect at either cost.
A Appendix: Experiment Instructions
This appendix provides instructions for both low cost treatments with the difference between low cost treatments showing up in the payoff table. The high cost treatments had similar instructions but with the cost of production and the exchange rate set to $6 and $500, Each round, you compete against one other firm (corresponding to one other participant in the session). Your competitor changes every round and is chosen randomly.
Each round, you and your competitor will sell an identical good. You must make two choices. You choose your production quantity and the price to charge for the good. Your profits depend on the quantity you choose, the quantity your competitor chooses, your price, and your competitor's price. Your profits are equal to your revenue minus your production cost.
Your production cost is equal to $1 times the quantity you choose to produce. So, the larger the quantity you choose, the higher your production cost will be.
Your revenue is equal to the price you charge times the quantity you sell. Note the the quantity you sell will not (necessarily) equal the quantity you produce. The total quantity sold by you and your competitor depends on the prices you and your competitor choose, with higher prices leading to lower quantities sold. Also, the way in which the total quantity sold is divided between you and your competitor depends on the prices you both choose. If you charge a price higher than your competitor, your competitor sells all of their inventory before you sell your first unit. If you charge a price lower than your competitor, you sell all of your inventory before your competitor sells any. If you charge the same price, the quantity sold is divided between you.
Summarizing, both choices involve a tradeoff. Choosing a higher quantity increases your production cost but gives you the possibility of selling more. Choosing a higher price allows you to earn more profit on the units you sell but reduces the number of units you sell.
Your actual profit each round will be determined from a table which is given to you. Thus, the details provided above are not necessary to play the game. They are provided so that you know how the profits listed in the table are determined. Now we will describe how the game progresses.
In the first part of each round, you choose a quantity between 1 and 12 (in hundreds of units). This number reflects the largest amount of the good that you can produce and sell in the round. After you make this choice, you find out the quantity chosen by your competitor, and your competitor finds out the quantity chosen by you.
In the second part of each round, you set your price, between 0 and 12. After you choose your price, you find out the price set by your competitor and you find out how much profit you earned. Your competitor also finds out the same information. Then, you move on to the next round with a new randomly selected competitor.
In order to make an informed decision, a table shows you the profits that you and your competitor will earn for every possible combination of choices. The table remains Before you begin playing the game, it is important that you attempt to understand the range of profits that you can earn depending on your quantity choice and your competitor's quantity choice. For this reason, we suggest you experiment by moving around both slider bars right now to see how the profit table changes.
Take a minute now to play around with the table to understand all of the information provided in the table. Understanding the information in the table is the key to leaving this experiment with more money.
See Figure 4 for an example of how the table appeared to subjects.
In the first part of each round, when you are choosing your quantity, you will have the ability to adjust both sliders to see all of the possible profit tables (as in the example table that you can see right now). Then, you will choose your quantity and click the Continue button to move on to the second part of the round.
In the second part of each round, the slider bars will be replaced by the actual quantity choices made in the first part of the round. At this point, the profit table that you will see will be the profit table corresponding to the quantity choices made by you and your competitor in the first part of the round. The slider bars are no longer available in this part of the round because you now know for sure which profit table your earnings will come from in this round. After you make your choice of price, you click Continue to find out the results of the round.
The results screen will highlight the row and column corresponding to your price and your competitor's price. It will also inform you of the profits you earned. When you are finished reading the results screen, click Continue to move on to the next round with a new randomly assigned competitor.
Remember, in the actual experiment, you only choose your own quantity and then your own price. The ability to move the slider for your competitor's quantity is provided so that you can see how your profits will change depending on your competitor's choice. This will allow you to make a more informed decision for yourself. However, in the actual game, your competitor will choose his or her own quantity.
On the next three screens, we will go through an example of how a round will work. If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand and ask them now.
We are now ready to begin the experiment. The experiment will consist of 40 rounds like the 2 practice rounds you just completed. However, in all subsequent rounds, you will be playing against an actual person in the room right now.
The 40 rounds are divided into 10 additional "practice" rounds followed by 30 "real" rounds for money. The purpose of the 10 practice rounds is to allow you to gain experience with the game with actual players. Everything about the 10 practice rounds is identical to the "real" rounds, except that the displayed earnings do not count toward your actual earnings. At the end of the 10 practice rounds, your earnings will be re-set to zero.
In the final 30 "real" rounds (after the 10 "practice" rounds), you will earn actual money based on the outcome of each round. Remember, the amount of money you will be paid at the end of this session is equal to 1/1500th of your firm's earnings in these rounds. For every $1500 your firm earns in the final 30 rounds, you will be paid $1.00 in cash.
